why do we need a constitution in india

A constitution is not needed by the country, but rather by its population. To understand how and why it is needed, we must harken back to the olden Roman times (archaism intentional, purely for stylistic purpose). Rome, like most ancient civilisations, did not have written laws. Whenever there was any dispute, the Senate, formed by the elderly patricians, was called to action. This was a very conservative system, not only were the Senators elderly and not elected, but they were members of the upper class. Their role was to know, interpret and apply customs when the dispute must be settled. This was a tremendous power, that they could use almost at whim to assert the privileges of the upper class when patricians and plebeians (the people) were in dispute. But as literacy spread (why do I remember McLuhan so often? ), the plebeians came up with the idea that they wanted those customs written down. This claim is revolutionary because it implies two things:
That the people wanted to know the law they had to obey. Knowing the law gives you, in theory, the power to avoid punishment for breaking it. They didn't want the law to be amended, changed or forgotten as the Senators saw fit. Fixing the law into written form meant to revoke the indiscrimnate jurisprudential power from the Senate. Here it was born the concept of clear separation between legislation and justice. Soon after the Twelve Tables were written, plebeians noticed that the laws were very strict and biased against the people. They then started to work towards changing them.

Thus we know the two main reasons why written laws are desirable:
Known laws can be evaluated as good and bad, noxious or beneficial, and improved or revoked. As the written law supersedes tradition, changes can be effected by editing the text, instead of waiting for the customs to change.
It will be recalled that during Бs premiership, a committee was set up to review the Constitution of India. It was commonly understood that that the political right-wing was of the view that the parliamentary form of government had proved itself inimical to the purposes both of national unity and rapid economic development, and that it was time to institute a more centralised presidential form of governance, top down. In all likelihood, the weight of general opinion proved too unprepared for such a drastic transformation in the systemic arrangements of IndiaБs constitutional life and history, and the committee did not come to much. The overriding national commitment to the parliamentary form of governance in India, underwritten by IndiaБs unparalleled diversity in cultural and local imperatives seemed piquantly and, to many, surprisingly reiterated when after the election results of 2014, Prime Minister Б in an iconic gesture full of semiotic symbolism Б visited the houses of Parliament to pay a kneeling obeisance to the Бtemple of democracyБ. Many who had speculated that IndiaБs federal structure might come under greater strain under a Modi dispensation than it was eventually under a Vajpayee one stood reassured that ModiБs commitment to Parliament was, if anything, far more demonstratively devotional.

Over time, however, this devotion seems to have suffered some debilitation. Modi has shown a distinct preference for communicating directly to the nation in a format where conversation or questioning is excluded. This rather Bonapartist or Peronist political leadership style naturally finds Parliament an irritating and cacophonous forum where anybody might exercise the Constitutional right to query the chief executive of the country. Thus, even when a parliament session might be on, the executive shows only a proforma and perfunctory willingness, at reduced levels, to answer to points of concern however crucial and widespread these might be to the life of the nation. It is to be noted that a new generation of Indians, post the neo-liberal opening up of the economy after the embrace of the Washington Consensus in 1990, have like their peers in other countries, shown a marked impatience with representative democratic processes. This new aspirational class of Indians can thus be seen to be vocally favourable to tendencies which mean to centralise political power in order to facilitate a greater and smoother centralisation of the productive life of the country, away from structures of democratic scrutiny and interrogation. Thus, in the current imbroglio about the decision to render some 86 per cent of the nationБs active currency defunct, Modi chose not to leave the announcement to the Reserve Bank of India but took it upon himself to use prime time television to make the declaration.

Even more significantly, as we write, the demands raised by a united Opposition in Parliament notwithstanding Б that the prime minister sit through the debate on the issue, having made the declaration in person, Modi has thus far chosen to disregard this constitutional propriety, if not imperative, and to make a direct reference to those who follow his twitter account about the rightness or not of the decision to demonetise. This latter move then must raise the question whether Parliament has a key constitutional role or not in supervising the executive branch of the state. The other very disquieting aspect of the current logjam is the rhetoric unleashed by the right-wing outside and inside Parliament which seeks, ab initio and ipso facto to dub all sceptical voices, including those of the elected representatives of the people, as driven, not even allegedly, by their support for corrupt systems and practices. A truly momentous inflection point is thus before the nation: Should Parliament be respected and strengthened, or should it be rendered defunct even as it exists on paper? And, if indeed a Peronist form of governance is to be emulated, should that be done after due structural transformation authorised by constitutional mechanisms or should it be made a reality without such authorisation as a fait accompli? For all the latest, download First Published on: December 6, 2016 12:04:24 am

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why do we need a constitution give any three reasons
why do we need to have a constitution
why do we have a bicameral congress
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why do we need a constitution give any three reasons
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